Electronically Filed

6/3/2019 11:24 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN

THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT

VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Appellate Court Case No: 46374-20 1 8

vs.

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Appeal From The Fifth District Court, Minidoka County
Judge John K. Butler

Jonathan R. Grover (#73 1 8)
Evans, Grover

& Beins, P.C.

Blake G. Hall (ISB#2434)
Sam L. Angell (ISB#7012)

& Associates, LLP

52 West Main Street
Post Ofﬁce Box 160
Tremonton, Utah 84337
Telephone: 435-740-8800
Facsimile: 435-740—8804

Facsimile: (208) 621-3008

Electronic Mail: jgrover@egb-law.com

Electronic Mail: bgh@hasatt0rneys.com

Hall Angel]

1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: (208) 522-3003

sla

hasattorne s.com

Attorneys for the Appellant

Attorneys for the Respondent

Victor Rodger Bliss

Minidoka

IITigation District

Table 0f Contents

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

...............................................................................................

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

...........................................................................................

7

...............................................................................................

8

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
ISSUES PRESENTED

.....................................................................................

11

............................................................................................

12

ON APPEAL

...............................................................................

19

....................................................................................

19

.....................................................................................................................

20

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

20

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE PLAINTIFF FAILED
TO FILE A SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM PURSUANT TO
TITLE 6, CHAPTER 9, AS TO COUNTS II, III & V.

20

............................................................................

1.

......................................

(A)

2

The

District Court Erred in Finding that Plaintiff’s

Counts

II

& III

comply With the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) since Counts
are Contract and Trust Claims, Not Subject t0 the Notice

Failed to
II

& III

Requirement of ITCA.
(B)

The

of the Notices.

since the District Court Failed t0 Address All

.................................................................................................

27

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT BLISS FAILED TO
ESTABLISH A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT TO SUPPORT A CLAIM
FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY.

32

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO ESTABLISH A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO THE
CLAIM OF WRONGFUL PROSECUTION.

....................................................

37

........................................................................

38

.........................................................

3.

22

District Court Erred in Finding that Plaintiff s Notices Failed to

Comply With the ITCA

2.

....................................................................................

(A)

Termination in Favor 0f Bliss.

(B)

Malice or criminal intent 0f MID .................................................................... 4O
1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINITIFF
FAILED TO ESTABLISH A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO THE
CLAIM OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. ............................................................ 43

4.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTANCE OF A CONTRACT
WITH THE DEFENDANT.

5.

...............................................................................

45

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE IS NO
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY FOR A CLAIM OF

6.

DECLARATORY RELIEF.
CONCLUSION

...............................................................................

48

.................................................................................................................

50

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Beaudoin

Davidson Trust Ca, 151 Idaho 701, 263 P.3d 755 (201 1)

v.

Black Canyon Racquetball Club,

Inc.

...........................

33

Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 119 Idaho 171,

v.

804 P.2d 900 (1991) ....................................................................................................... 34
Blass

v.

County ofTwin Falls, 132 Idaho 451, 974 P.2d 503 (1999) ................................ 29

Bradshaw

v.

Milner Low Lift Irrigation

District, 85

Idaho 528, 381 P.2d 440

(1963) ................................................................................................................. 25, 35, 36

Bushi
City

v.

Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 203 P.3d 694 (2009) ......................... 33

ofChubbuck v.

City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 203 (1995)

CNW, LLC v. New Sweden Irr.
Country Cove Dev.,

Inc.

County ofKootenai

v.

Cox

v.

Cizy

v.

..................................

Dist, 161 Idaho 89, 383 P.3d 1259 (2016)

May, 143 Idaho 595, 150 P.3d 288 (2006)

Western Casually

& Surely C0.,

22

.....................

21

............................

33

113 Idaho 908, 916 (1988) ........ 22

ofSandpoim, 140 Idaho 127, 90 P.3d 352 (Ct App. 2003)

......................

29, 30

DbSi/Tri VP’Ship

Farber

v.

P’ship v Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 948 P.2d 151 (1997).

Idaho State Ins. Fund, 152 Idaho 495, 272 P.3d 467 (2012)

v.

’

Farmers Co-operative Ditch C0.

v.

Riverside

Irr.

...................

25

............................

25

Dist, 14 Idaho 450, 94 P. 761

(1908) ............................................................................................................................. 35

Gedney

Hayes

v.

Snake River Irr. Dist, 61 Idaho 605, 104 P.2d 909 (1940) .............................. 35

State,

v.

Herrold

v.

146 Idaho 353, 195 P.3d 712 (2008)

........................................................

39

Idaho State Sch. For Deaf& Blind, 112 Idaho 410, 732 P.2d 379

(1987) ....................................................................................................................... 38, 4O

High Valley Concrete, L.L.C.

v.

Sargent, 149 Idaho 423, 234 P.3d 747 (2010) ......... 33, 34

Huﬂv.

Uh], 103 Idaho 274, 647 P.2d

Hull

Giesler, 156 Idaho 765, 331 P.3d

v.

Idaho First Nat'l Bank

v.

730 (1982)

.............................................................

507 (2014)

.................................................

Bliss Valley Foods, Ina, 121 Idaho 266,

28

46, 47

824 P.2d 841

(1991) ............................................................................................................................. 34

Johnson
James

v.

McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 210 P.3d 563

Runft, Leroy,

v.

Cofﬁn

& Matthews,

(Ct.

App. 2009)

...........................

44, 45

Chtd., 125 Idaho 607, 873 P.2d 861

(1994) ............................................................................................................................. 33

Lewiston Orchards

Luther

v.

Irr. Dist. v.

v.

Mitchell

.......

26, 35, 47

First Bank, 64 Idaho 416, 133 P.2d 717 (1943) ................................................. 38

Medical Recovery Servs, LLC.
Michell

Gilmore, 53 Idaho 377, 23 P.2d 720 (1933)

v.

v.

Neumeier, 163 Idaho 504, 415 P.3d 372 (2018). ......... 46

Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396,

582 P.2d 1074 (1978) ............................................... 20

Bingham Memorial Hosp, 130 Idaho 420, 942 P.2d 544 (1997)

...................

31

N. Idaho Bldg. Contrs. Ass

’n v.

City

ofHayden, 432 P.3d 976, 423 P.3d 976

(2018) ............................................................................................................................. 25

Nampa & Meridian Irr.
Nelsan

Niday

Paslay

Peavy

Barker, et

al.,

16 Idaho 73 (1909)

.................................................................

34, 35

162 Idaho 866, 406 P.3d 878 (2017) ................ 21, 48, 49

Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655, 551 P.2d 610 (1976) .................................................. 22

v.

Pioneer Irr. Dist.

Shannahan
Skinner

v.

City OfCaldwell, 153 Idaho 593, 288 P.3d 810 (2012)

Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 816 P.2d 982 (1991)

v.

Read v. Harvey,

Smith

Barclay, 56 Idaho 13, 47 P.2d 916 (1935) ..................... 36

A & B Irrigation Dist,

v.

Pounds

v.

Pehrson, 148 Idaho 157, 219 P.3d 809 (2009) ............................................ 26, 35

v.

v.

Dist.

v.

v.

....................

26

.................................................

31

141 Idaho 497, 499, 112 P.3d 785, 787 (2005)

paSSim

Gigray, 131 Idaho 664, 962 P.2d 1048 (1998) ..................................... 38, 4O

U.S.

Bank Mani, 159 Idaho 642 (2016) ..................................................... 33, 34

City ofPreston, 99 Idaho 618, 586 P.2d 1062 (1978)

v.

...............................

Sprinkler Irr. C0.

671-72 (2004)

v.

...................................

28, 29

John Deere Ins. C0., 139 Idaho 691, 695-96, 85 P.3d 667,

.........................................................................................................

passim

State

v.

Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 861 P.2d 1234 (Ct. App. 1993) ................................... 39

State

v.

Cameron, 30 Wash.App. 229, 633 P.2d 901 (1981)

State

v.

Cheeney, 144 Idaho 294, 160 P.3d 451 (2007)

Stephenson

v.

Pioneer Irr. Dist, 49 Idaho 189, 288

P.

Stems

v.

Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 240 P.2d 833 (1952)

Talley

v.

TH] C0., 140 Idaho

Vreeken

v.

253, 92 P.3d 503 (2004)

Lockwood Engineering,

............................................

..............................................

38, 39

..................................

26

....................................................

33

.....................................................

33

421 (1930)

B. V., 148 Idaho 89 (2009)

4

39

.................................

passim

Wade Baker

& Sons Farms v.

Corp. OfPresiding Bishop ofChurch ofJesuS Christ

ofLatter-Day Saints, 136 Idaho 922, 42 P.3d 715

Wickstrom

Yaden

v.

v.

(Ct.

App. 2002) .............................. 34

N. Idaho Coll, 111 Idaho 450, 725 P.2d 155 (1986)

Gem Irr.

Dist, 37 Idaho 300, 216

P250

............................

23, 24

(1923) ........................................... 26, 35

Statutes

I.C. §

6-906 ........................................................................................................................ 27

22

I.C.

§§6-901

I.C.

§10-1201

I.C.

§12-117(1)

I.C.

§12-121

I.C.

§18-4304 ..................................................................................................................... 17

I.C.

§19-101

I.C.

§19-3506 ..................................................................................................................... 39

I.C.

§19-5304 ............................................................................................................... 38, 39

I.C.

§42-1201

I.C.

§43-101

I.C.

§43-304 ....................................................................................................................... 41

I.C.

§43-316 ....................................................................................................................... 35

I.C.

§6-902(2)

I.C.

§6-903

I.C.

§6-904 ................................................................................................................... 40, 41

.......................................................................................................................

.....................................................................................................................

48

..................................................................................................................

19

.......................................................................................................................

20

.......................................................................................................................

39

.....................................................................................................................

42

12,

35

.................................................................................................................

....................................................................................................................

27

.........................................................................................................................

22

InCo

§6 90;

I.C.

§74-121(1)

..................................................................................................................

42

I.C.

§74-124(1)

..................................................................................................................

43

I.C.

§9-600 ......................................................................................................................... 29

ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo

I.C.A., §42-311

..................................................................................................................

Idaho Code §50-219

2;

26

..........................................................................................................

29

..................................................................................................................

36

Other Authorities
100 A.L.R. 557
Black’s

Law Dictionary,

1219

(6th ed.

1990).

...................................................................

26

Rules
I.A.P.,

Rule 14(a) ................................................................................................................. 7

I.R.C.P. 56(0)

..............................................................................................................

Idaho Appellate Rule, Rule 41
Idaho Appellate Rules, Rule

passim

..........................................................................................

11.

19

..........................................................................................

7

Idaho Appellate Rules, Rule 4 ............................................................................................. 7
Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure, Rule 54(a)(1) .................................................................... 7

Constitutional Provisions
Const., Art 15 §4 ................................................................................................................ 36

Const, Art 15 §5 ................................................................................................................ 36
Idaho Constitution,

art.15,

§4

............................................................................................

25

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Victor Bliss (hereinafter Appellant/Petitioner and/or Mr. Bliss) appeals from the

ﬁve

dismissal of his Complaint on

— Breach 0f Fiduciary Duty;
Count

separate claims: (1)

Count

(3)

III

—

Count

Trespass; (4) Count

MID’S

failure t0 deliver

district court

.

.

may

.

and

Relief;

Supreme Court from

“An

4.

the following judgments and orders

judgment has been entered on

as a matter of right

.”
.

.

all

claims for

.”
.

relief,

.

.

.

I.A.R.,

.

(1) Final

Rule

11.

may be

district court

“A judgment is

0n any judgment 0r order of the
.”
.

if

“Any

.

.

.

all

appeal

within 42 days from the date evidenced by the ﬁling stamp 0f

the clerk 0f the court

.

ﬁnal

may be made only by physically ﬁling a notice of appeal

district court

civil or criminal action.

taken to the

judgments, as deﬁned in

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.), Rule 54(a)(1).

from the

I.A.P.,

district court

appealable as a matter of right

Rule 14(a)

The Honorable John K. Butler 0f

Memorandum

some

except costs and fees, asserted by or against

with the clerk 0f the

entered a

(5)

order 0r decree, as deﬁned in these rules,

appeal as a matter 0f right

Rule 54(a) of the Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure

parties in the action.

II

appeal such decision to the Supreme Court as provided in these rules.”

Idaho Appellate Rules (I.A.R.), Rule

any

IV — Declaratory

Count

(2)

water to Mr. Bliss.

“Any party aggrieved by an appealable judgment,

in

— Breach of Contract;

V — Wrongful Prosecution/Inﬂection 0f Extreme Emotional Distress; all occurring in

relation t0

0f a

I

summary

the Fifth Judicial District Court,

Decision Re: Motion for

Court’s Judgment on August 06, 2018 dismissing

Minidoka County,

Summary Judgment Which culminated

all

into the

ﬁve 0f Plaintiff” s causes 0f action, dismissing

Defendant’s Count l-Trespass, and remanding Defendant’s Count II-Declaratory Relief to the

Minidoka

Irrigation District.

Subsequently, the Court entered a Decision and Order Re: Attorney

Fees and Costs which culminated into the Court’s

Amended Judgment on October

17,

2018

awarding Minidoka Irrigation District

On

(R, p.41 1-442).

costs of $1,78 1 .96 against Plaintiff Victor

is

Bliss.

September, 14, 2018, Within 42 days from the court entering Judgment, Mr.

Bliss timely ﬁled a Notice 0f Appeal. (R, p.443-449).

and decide

jurisdiction to hear

Rodger

Therefore, the Idaho

Supreme Court has

this appeal.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The general nature 0f this case

is

MID’S

past and continuing breaches of contractual and

ﬁduciary duties owed t0 Mr. Bliss; and MID’S egregious actions t0 harm, defame, prosecute and
inﬂict severe emotional distress

MID

is

Bliss.

a water district organized and operating under LC. Sec. 43-101 et seq. t0 hold and

deliver water t0

series

upon Mr.

member landowners

its

within

its

boundaries. (R, p.412).

MID has

0f contracts with the United States 0f America, Department 0f the

entered into a

Interior,

Bureau 0f

Reclamation, providing for management 0f water rights and easements in furtherance 0f its duties

owed t0

its

members. (R, p.162, p.201-234). Mr. Bliss

is

the

owner 0f 75.87 acres ofreal property

located in the Minidoka Irrigation District. (R, p.291 (p.49, L.4), p.412). In 1998,
lateral canal that

0n the

canal,

ran along the Bliss’ property. (R, p.412).

MID

excavated and deposited

encroachment upon Mr.
to P.9, L.17),

p.249 (p.1

Mr. Bliss
p.97).

is

Then again 4-5 years ago while working

onto Mr. Bliss’ real property destroying a fence.

1),

p.248 (P.8, L.15 to P.9, L.17), p.260 (p.10, L.12-24).

MID

has refused t0 remedy the continuing trespass and

(R, p.165, p.241 (p.1 15, L.2 to p.1 17, L.1

Despite multiple requests from Bliss,

soil

MID moved a

Bliss’ real property. (R, p.241 (p.1 15, L.2 to p.1 17, L.1 1), p.248 (P.8, L. 1 5

1,

also a

L.1-2)).

member of MID

entitled to divert irrigation

water t0 his property. (R,

The member is tasked With ordering the delivery 0f water from the

ditch rider, 0r other

personnel. (R., p.97, p.294 (P.96, L.6 to P.97, L.10), p.297 (P.1 16, L.7-13)).

MID

On or about June 28,

2016, Mr. Bliss called Frank Hunt, Chairman of MID, to report

insufﬁcient water levels being delivered t0

him Which were inadequate

t0 operate his

pump.

(R,

p.251 (P.20, L.21 to P.21, L.9), p.285). Despite Bliss ordering the delivery of water from the
ditch rider and other

Bliss. (R,

MID personnel previously, MID

failed to deliver the requested

water t0

p.239 (P.47, L.1 1-14), p.253 (P.28,L.24 to P.29, L.4). Chairman Hunt inspected Bliss’

head gate and setup

that

backed up the water and concluded

Board agreed an overtop 0f the

spill

would be

better.

it

was

a

“Mickey Mouse

(R, p.249 (P.10, L.16 to P.1

1,

setup”; the

L.1

1)).

After Visiting Bliss’ real property earlier 0n 0r about June 28, 2016, Chairman Hunt

received another phone call from Bliss later in the evening, at which time Bliss again reported he

had insufﬁcient water

t0 operate his

p.285). Bliss also informed

pump.

Chairman Hunt

orders. (R, p.25 1-2 (P.21, L.23 t0 P.22, L.

measures t0 get more water,

(R, p.25 1, (P.21, L.12-16), p.254 (P.3
that his ditch rider doesn’t provide

Chairman Hunt authorized

1).

telling Bliss, “.

.

.it

1,

L.1-24),

him the water he

Bliss to take necessary

sounds like he needed more water in the ditch.”

(R, p.251 (P.21, L.1-16), p.254 (P.31, L.1-3)).

At

the

same time, Chairman Hunt was aware

to get

more water had a lock and chain 0n

“[m]y

intent

p.285).

was

MID’S

that

he (Bliss) would turn in a

MID;

Chairman Hunt, allows water users

we would tweak the head
it

little

was too

full,

more water

we would

gate.

When the
it.

at the

head 0f the

open

stated,

ditch.” (R,

pump

head

gates; “[a]11

lateral got too

10W,

for

as the water user’s

However, the practice among water users, such

to operate the

lower

Chairman Hunt

t0

Chairman Hunt and places responsibility

leaving only a watermaster, screen and

responsibility. (R, p.293 (P.91, L.1 1-25)).

when

head gate Bliss would need

(R, p.252 (P.23, L.16-21)).

policy, however, directly contradicts

a head gate upon

me),

it.

that the

as

my life (and my father before

we would open it up

My neighbors all did the same.

.”
.

(R, p.285).

a touch;

Chairman Hunt has

also

acknowledged

has had complaints against M.I.D.

.

.

that,

MID.

ﬂows

it

Member 0f MID,

stated a

it still

wastes a

lot

recommendation

to

Change the head gate for

“
.

.

nobody can

regulate

it.

now where

“[r]ight

of water because they’re not going t0 regulate

end.” (R, p.261 (P.17, L.5-9). The head gate

.

Visited Bliss’ property t0 investigate Bliss’

ﬂow over rather than a combination of over and under, because,

underneath,

because,

a couple 0f years, Victor Bliss

(R, p.249 (P.10, L.16-20)).

Mr. Goff, a Board
the water to

at least

[s]ome 0f them probably are legitimate, and some, not so

.

much.” (R, p.285). MID’S Board 0f Directors have
claims against

“[ﬂor

It’s

MID uses t0

just a

ﬁght

all

service Bliss with water

it

at the

inadequate

is

the time.” (R, p.261 (P.15, L.22-23)).

Next, Bliss uses a drain ditch t0 ensure his property does not ﬂood during spring runoff.
(R, p.257 (P.63, L.4-14)).

MID

is

responsible t0 place a plug in Bliss’ drain ditch during the

irrigation season to

keep the irrigation water from running backwards. (R, p.257 (P.63, L.4—6)).

The plug placed by

MID

.

.

.

the water goes

(P.63, L.6-14)).

is “.

down to

.

.

t0

be taken out in the

that drain ditch.

MID is also aware “.

.

.

.

.

left

when the

spring runoff come(s)

continues 0n into another drain ditch. (R, p.257

been a year 0r two

that they

Manager Davidson reported

However, Chairman Hunt assured Mr. Bliss

monitor the situation and be responsible for

MID

so that

failed t0 eradicate

Mr.

Bliss’ real property, causing water

(P.1

1,

its

that

(MID)

in April,

the plug out of the drain during the irrigation season to see

for the year. (R, p.322-3).

Lastly,

it

that there’s

take the plug out.” (R, p.257 (P.63, L.1 1-14)).

had intentionally

.

fall

forgot t0

2016

how

MID Will

it

that

Will

he

work

continue to

water. (R, p.322-3).

noxious weeds on

its

canal easement area running through

ﬂow t0 be restricted and large trees

t0

grow. (R, p.260

L.3-15), p.270 (P.30, L.3-6), p.271 (P.46, L.3 t0 P.47, L.9). Mr. Bliss has taken steps to

reasonably act by taking advantage of an

MID policy allowing him t0 place

10

a screen around his

head gate

t0 prevent trash

from getting

into his

pump.

(R, p.250 (P.15, L.8-21), p.242 (P. 125,

L.5—14), p.293 (13.91, L.14-17).

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On April

17,

2017, Mr. Bliss ﬁled this action in the Fifth Judicial District Court 0fthe State

of Idaho, in and for Minidoka County. (R, pp.2,

10).

The action was ﬁled

alleging

breach of contract; (2) breach of ﬁduciary duty; (3) trespass; (4) declaratory

wrongful prosecution/inﬂiction of extreme emotional

The case was assigned

t0

ﬁve

counts: (1)

relief;

and

(5)

distress. (R, p.3-7).

Judge Jonathan P. Brody,

Who

entered an Order t0 Disqualify

himself 0n April 26, 2017. (R, p.17). Judge John K. Butler was then assigned. (R, p.19). After
which,

MID

ﬁled an Answer to Complaint and

MID

22, 2017. (R, p.21-32).

Demand

On August
Judge Michael

10,

On May

for Jury Trial

25, 2017,

and Counterclaim 0n

May

counterclaim: (1) Trespass; and

its

MID

ﬁled an

Amended Answer

t0

and Counterclaim. (R, p.33—44).

2017, the Court entered an Order of Assignment reassigning the case t0

P. Tribe. (R., p.62).

After several months of discovery and 0n

Judgment. (R, p.1

On

17).

Defendant’s Motion for

April

7,

P. Tribe

March 6, 2018,

2018, Mr. Bliss ﬁled a

Summary Judgment.

0f Summary Judgment was ﬁled April

Michael

for Jury Trial

alleged two causes of action in

(2) Declaratory Relief. (R, p.28-31).

Complaint and

Demand

16,

(R, p.161).

MID ﬁled a Motion for Summary
Memorandum

in Opposition t0

MID’s Reply Memorandum

2018. (R, p.363).

On

in Support

April 23, 2018, the Honorable

heard oral arguments on the summary judgment motion from the parties.

(R.,

p.395).

On June
On June

26, 2018, Judge Michael P. Tribe disqualiﬁed himself

27, 2018, Judge

John K. Butler was assigned

11

from the

case. (R, p.405).

to the case for all further proceedings. (R,

p.407).

On

July

9,

2018, the Court entered an Order

Advisement ﬁnding the

parties

for

Motion

agreement that Judge Butler could

the oral arguments in lieu 0f rescheduling a hearing

(R, p.409).

re:

On August 6, 2018, Judge John K.

for

Summary Judgment Under

listen t0 the

0n the pending motion

Butler issued a

for

audio recording 0f

summary judgment.

Memorandum Decision Re: Motion

Summary Judgment.
Judge John K. Butler ordered that Mr. Bliss’ Complaint be dismissed, MID’S Count

Trespass be dismissed, and

MID’S Count

II

for Declaratory Relief be remanded. (R, p.437).

for

I

The

Court issued and entered a Judgment the same day. (R, p.440).

Mr. Bliss thereafter ﬁled a timely Notice 0f Appeal on September

14, 2018. (R, p.443-9).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mr. Bliss

is

the

owner 0f 75.87 acres of real property located

in

Minidoka County, Idaho

Within the service boundaries ofMinidoka Irrigation District. (R., p.291 (p.49, L.4), p.412).
2.

MID

is

a water district organized and operating under LC. §43-101 et seq. t0 hold and

deliver water to

3.

MID has
0f the

its

member landowners

Within

its

boundaries. (R., p.412).

entered into a series of contracts with the United States of America, Department

Interior,

Bureau 0f Reclamation, providing

for

management of water

rights

and

easements. (R., p.162, p.201-234).

MID moved a lateral canal that ran along the Bliss property.

4.

In 1998,

5.

While moving 0f the

lateral canal,

MID

excavated and deposited

soil

(R., p.97, p.412).

onto Mr. Bliss’ real

property. (R., p.97).

6.

Approximately 4-5 years ago,

MID again excavated and deposited soil onto Mr. Bliss’

real

property from the lateral canal, destroying a fence. (R., p.165, p.241 (P.1 15, L.2 t0 P.1 17,
L.1

1),

p.248 (R8, L.15 to P.8, L17), p.260 (P.10, L.12—24)).
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Despite multiple requests from Bliss,

and encroachment upon Mr.
p.248

.

(13.8,

Mr. Bliss

L.15 to

is

13.9,

has refused t0 remedy the continuing trespass

Bliss’ real property. (R., p.241 (P.1 15, L.2 t0 P.1 17, L.1 1),

L17), p.249

member of MID

also a

MID

(P.1

1,

L.1—2)).

entitled to divert irrigation water t0 his property. (R.,

p.97).

MID
10.

does not allocate a speciﬁc amount 0f water to each acre 0r member. (R., p.97).

Members

are authorized t0 divert onto acres With a

MID water right appurtenant,

sufﬁcient

water to grow a crop. (R., p.97).
11.

The member landowner
0r other

12.

On

MID personnel.

is

tasked with ordering the delivery 0f water from the ditch rider,

(R., p.97,

p.294 (P.96, L.6 t0 P.97, L.10), p.297 (P.1 16, L.7-13)).

0r about June 28, 2016, Mr. Bliss called Frank Hunt, Chairman 0f

insufﬁcient water levels being delivered to

(R.,

13.

t0 report

him Which were inadequate to operate his pump.

p.251 (P.20, L.21 to P.21, L9), p.285).

Despite Mr. Bliss ordering the delivery 0f water from the ditch rider and other
personnel,

14),

14.

MID,

MID

failed t0 deliver the requested water t0

Mr.

Bliss. (R.,

p.239 (P.47, L.1

1-

p.253 (P.28,L.24 to P.29, L.4).

Chairman Hunt had inspected
concluded

it

Bliss’

was a “Mickey Mouse”

overtop of the
15. After Visiting

spill

Mr.

would be

better.

head gate and setup
setup, to

(R.,

which the

that

rest

backed up the water and

0f the Board agreed that an

p.249 (P.IO, L.16 to P.1

Bliss’ real property in the afternoon

1,

L.1

1)).

0n June 28, 2016, Chairman Hunt

received a phone call from Mr. Bliss later in the evening reporting that Mr. Bliss
insufﬁcient water t0 operate his

was

MID

pump and

that his

pump had

cavitating. (R., p.251 (P.20, L.21 t0 P.21, L.16), p.285)).
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t0

still

had

be shut down because

it

16.

Mr. Bliss informed Chairman Hunt that his ditch rider doesn’t provide him the water he
orders nor opens/closes the head gate. (R. p.242 (P.124, L.19-24), p.251-2 (P.21,

L23

t0

P.22, L.1).

17.

Chairman Hunt authorized Mr.
Mr.

“.

Bliss,

.it

.

Bliss t0 take necessary measures t0 get

sounds like he needed more water in the ditch.”

more

water, telling

(R., p.251 (P.21, L.1-16),

p.254 (P31, L.1-3)).
18.

At the time Chairman Hunt was
aware

0n
19.

it.

that the

(R.,

talking t0 Mr. Bliss

head gate Bliss would need

t0

open

0n the telephone, Chairman Hunt was

t0 get

more water had a lock and chain

p.252 (P.23, L. 16-21)).

Chairman Hunt

stated,

“[m]y

intent

was

that

he (Bliss) would turn in a

little

more water

at

the head 0f the ditch.” (R., p.285).

20.

MID’S

oral policy,

however, places responsibility for a head gate upon MID, leaving only

a watermaster, screen and

pump

as the water user’s responsibility. (R., p.293-294 (P.91,

L.11 to P.92, L.16)).
21. Contary t0

MID’S

oral policy, the

common practice

of other water users, such as Chairman

Hunt, permits water users t0 operate the head gates;
me),

we would tweak the head

touch;

When

it

was too

full,

gate.

When the

we would

lower

“[a]ll

my life

lateral got too

it.

10w,

My neighbors

(and

my

father before

we would open

it

did the same.

.”

all

.

up a
(R.,

p.285).

22.

MID

acknowledges

against M.I.D.

.

.

.

that “[f]0r at least a couple

0f years, Victor Bliss has had complaints

[s]0me 0f them probably are legitimate, and some, not so much.”

p.285).
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(R.,

23. In approximately

Mr.

gate. (R,

(R.,

ﬂow

27.

it

was

letting the

it still

wastes a

water suck through

away from him

lot

change Mr. Bliss’ head gate for the

it.

[Bliss].

.

.

.

.

.

When
.

it

gets

[r]ight

“[i]t

now Where
it

ﬂows

it

p.260 (P.12, L.12-20), p.261 (P.17, L.5-9).

nobody can

regulate

it.

It’s

just a

seen the problem and seen what

told

it

at the end.”

ﬁght

all

condition 0f Mr. Bliss’ head gate, stating,

him

.

.

.

it

was,

I

“
.

.

the time.” (R., p.261 (P.15, L.22-23)).

Wes Goff contacted another Board Member t0 express ﬁxing Mr. Bliss’ head gate;
I

had an

10w 0n volume,

0f water because they’re not going t0 regulate

Wes Goff expressed the poor unserviceable
.

to

over rather than a combination of over and under, because,

just suck everything

underneath,

(R.,

Visited Bliss’ property t0 investigate Bliss’ claims against

Board Member of MID, recommended

undertow, and

would

to

p.249 (P.10, L.16-20) p.260 (P.10, L.8-14)).

25. Mr. Goff, a

water t0

MID’S manager Dan Davidson went

p.296 (P.102, L.14 to P.103, L.7)).

MID’S Board 0f Directors have
MID.

26.

or December, 2016,

board of directors, t0 investigate and even took pictures 0f the

Bliss’ property, With the

head
24.

November

called our other

Ron, you need t0 go out and 100k

at

it.

.

.

.

“.
.

.after

Board member, Ron Kowitz,

[W]e are in the wrong 0n this.” (R.,

p.265 (P.34, L.6-10)).
28.

Manager Dan Davidson
discuss the problems

29.

MID

also Visited Mr. Bliss’ real property with the

MID was having.

(R.,

Board Members

p.297 (P.1 17, L.3-13)).

Secretary Ruth Bailes received Bliss’ claims and discussed them with

Dan Davidson and

to

MID Manager

the board 0f directors. (R, pp.95-96, 99; p.345 (P.13, L.3-22); p.346

(P.47, L.20 to P.48, L.1)).
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30. Despite

acknowledgments by MID, Chairman Hunt, Manager Davidson, Secretary Bailes,

Board Member Goff, and other Board Members,
and

MID

Bliss’ complaints

has performed no canal maintenance and

water delivery devices used by Bliss.

(R.,

have received no

made no changes

head gate or

to the

p.249 (P.12, L.23 t0 P.13, L.1

relief,

p.261 (P.17,

1),

L.19-23), p.346 (P.47, L.20 to P.49, L.3).

31.

Wes Goff further stated,

“.
.

.

Iwas kind 0f disgraced

one 0f our Board members, Ron Kowitz

know,

it

just didn’t

seem

like

some 0f our water users got

.

.

33.

On

Minidoka

2016, Ruth Bailes,
Sheriff’s

Ofﬁce

am ashamed

t0

why I told

be 0n here anymore.

.

.

.

I

You

don’t think

the respect they deserved.” (R., p.262 (P.20, L.7-13)).

Mr. Bliss was a water user not respected by
5,

I

be 0n the Board. That’s

— they (Management) hadn’t got any respect.

32.

July

.

t0

MID

MID

Management.

(R.,

p.20 (P.20, L. 14-15)).

secretary, provided a signed witness statement t0 the

stating false facts

and assertions concerning water Bliss had

previously ordered and authority he was provided

by Frank Hunt

t0 retrieve additional

water. (R., p.349, 353 (P.75, L.8 to P.77, L.25), 413).

34. Likewise, other

MID

employees,

Amber

Christensen,

also provided signed Witness statements to the

Vance Johnson, and Dan Davidson

Minidoka

Sheriff” s

Ofﬁce

stating false facts

0r assertions concerning water Bliss had previously ordered and authority he

by Frank Hunt
35.

was provided

t0 retrieve additional water. (R., p.35 1-352, 354-357, 413).

MID’S own attorney, Kent Fletcher also conspired With MID Manager Dan Davidson in an
e-mail dated June 30, 3016 t0 wrongfully charge Bliss with opening a head gate t0 obtain

more water after Frank Hunt had provided permission t0
to P.27, L.21)).
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Bliss. (R. p.252-3,

358 (P.25,L.20

36.

On July 28,

2016, the Minidoka County Prosecutor ﬁled a misdemeanor complaint against

Bliss charging

37. After several

him With Wrongful Diversion 0f Water, LC. §18-4304.

(R., p.413-414).

months ofproceedings, the case was dismissed on or about October

3

1

,

2016.

(R. p.414).

and attorney fees for

38. Bliss incurred costs

damage

t0 his reputation

39. Furthermore,

6,

(R.,

it

2017, through a records request, Ruth Bailes,

Minidoka Sheriff Deputy’s body camera recording 0f an

whereat Mr. Bliss was present, played
distributed

it

to

members 0f MID,

to certain

MID
all

employees and

prior to a

member

directors,

MID

altercation

and copied and

vote on board members.

p.347-349 (P.67, L.20 t0 P.68, L.6; P.69, L.13 to P.70, L.25; P.71, L.18 t0 P.75, L.1)).

40. Bliss has a drain ditch to help ensure his property does not

p.257

ﬂood during

spring runoff. (R.,

(13.63, L.4—14)).

41 During the
.

summer

season,

MID

places a plug in Bliss’ drain ditch t0 keep the irrigation

water (from) running backwards in
42.

and

and character of $50,000.00. (R, p.301-303, 414).

0n or before November

secretary, obtained a

his criminal defense totaling $4,430.16

The plug placed by MID
runoff come(s)

.

.

.

is “.

.

.

this drain ditch. (R.,

p.257 (P.63, L.4-6)).

supposed to be taken out in the

the water goes

down

t0 that drain ditch.

.

fall

.

so that

When the

spring

it

continues on into

(MID)

forgot to take the

.[and]

another drain ditch. (R., p.257 (P.63, L.6-14).
43.

MID

is

also

aware

“.
.

.

that there’s

been a year or two

that they

plug out.” (R., p.257 (P.63, L.1 1-14)).
44.

Manager Davidson reported
drain to see

how

it

in April,

would work

2016

that

he had intentionally

for the year. (R., p.322-3).
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left

the plug out of the

45.

Chairman Hunt assured Mr.
responsible for

46.

On

its

MID

Bliss that

Will continue to monitor the situation

and be

water. (R., p.322-3).

April 12, 2016, Robert “Hap” Boyer, Bureau 0f Reclamation,

Board t0 discuss the Canal Lateral 1712

came before

the

MID

alteration issues concerning Victor Bliss’ property.

(R., p.322-5).

47. Mr.

Boyer had met with Bliss and his family,

Reclamation (BOR) employees.
48. Mr.

Boyer reviewed the

as well as

Manager Davidson and Bureau 0f

1712

have occurred since 1993, and the

(R., p.323).

alterations t0 Lateral

that

concerns with where the lateral was located 0n the Knopps’ and McCalls’ properties. (R,
p.323).

49. Mr.

it

stated that the lateral could possibly be located

Boyer

0n

the Bliss’ property and that

may need t0 be moved t0 allow for MID’S easements without affecting the Bliss property.

(R., p.323).

50. Additionally,

MID

failed to eradicate

noxious weeds on

through Bliss’ real property, causing water

ﬂow

t0

be

its

canal easement area running

restricted. (R.,

p.270 (P30, L.3-6),

p.271 (P.46, L.3 t0 P.47, L9).
51. Despite all

MID’s

failures, Bliss

has taken steps to reasonably act and mitigate his damages

by spraying and mowing weeds and vegetation along

the canal bank. (R., p.244 (P.134,

L.7-22)).

52.

Mr. Bliss has taken reasonable steps

MID

to mitigate his

damages by taking advantage of an

policy allowing

him

t0 place a screen

pump.

(R.,

p.250 (P.15, L.8-21), p.242 (P.125, L.5-14), p.293 (P.91, L.14-

getting into his

17).

18

around his head gate t0 prevent trash from

ISSUES PRESENTED
A.

ON APPEAL

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT.
1.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO FILE A SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM PURSUANT TO
TITLE 6, CHAPTER 9, AS TO COUNTS II, III & V.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED

IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO ESTABLISH A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT TO SUPPORT A CLAIM
FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED

IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
DAILED TO ESTABLISH A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO THE CLAIM OF
WRONGFUL PROSECUTION.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINITIFF
FAILED TO ESTABLISH A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO THE CLAIM OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTANCE OF A CONTRACT WITH THE
DEFENDANT.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED

IN FINDING THAT THERE IS NO
A
CLAIM
FOR
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
OF DECLARATORY RELIEF.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Bliss

is

seeking his attorneys fees on appeal. “Unless otherwise provided by statute, in

any proceeding involving as adverse

parties a state

agency or a

political subdivision

and a

person, the state agency, political subdivision 0r the court hearing the proceeding, including the

appeal, shall

award the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s

fees, witness fees

and other

reasonable expenses, if it ﬁnds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in
fact 0r law.” I.C. §12-1 17(1);

See also Rule 41, Idaho Appellate Rule.
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Additionally, [i]n any civil action, the judge

prevailing party or parties

When

the judge

ﬁnds

that the case

amount

to

is

entitled to

attorney fees t0 the

was brought, pursued or defended

LC. §12-121.

frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.”

Bliss

may award reasonable

an award of his attorney fees as a prevailing party in

be established through afﬁdavit subsequent to

this this court’s

Such

this appeal.

ﬁnding of Bliss as the

prevailing party.

ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
In ruling

Whether there
entitled t0

is

0n an appeal from summary judgment the supreme court
a genuine issue as t0 any material

judgment

as a matter

depositions, and admissions

0n

0f law; and

this

fact;

and

(2)

determination

Will determine: (1)

Whether the moving party

is

t0

be based 0n the "pleadings,

ﬁle, together with the afﬁdavits, if anyg"

however, the court

should liberally construe the facts in favor 0f the party opposing the motion, together With
reasonable inferences from the evidence. Michell

v.

is

Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396,

all

582 P.2d 1074

(1978).

The

district court erred

genuine issues of material

1.

fact,

by granting summary judgment 0n
and

Bliss’ claims

MID was not entitled t0 judgment as

because there are

a matter 0f law.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO
A SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM PURSUANT TO TITLE 6,
CHAPTER 9, AS TO COUNTS II, III & V.

FILE

Introduction

This

III

district court

(Trespass)

erroneously dismissed Mr. Bliss’ claims

II

(Breach 0f Fiduciary Duty),

& V (Wrongful Prosecution/Inﬂiction 0f Extreme Emotional Distress), ruling they
20

did not comply with the Idaho Tort Claims Act (hereafter “ITCA”). Contrary to the district
court’s decision there are at least

two basis

for reversal. First,

the claims because claims for Breach of Fiduciary

property claims. Second, even

n0tice(s)

were ﬁled

for

Extreme Emotional

if notice

n0 notice was required for two 0f

Duty and Trespass

was required under

Breach 0f Fiduciary Duty, Trespass

the

are contract and/or real

ITCA, sufﬁcient

tort

claim

& Wrongful Prosecution/Inﬂiction 0f

Distress.

Standard ofReview

We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment under the same standard applied by
the

trial court.

Read v. Harvey,

reviews de novo

.

.

.

141 Idaho 497, 499, 112 P.3d 785, 787 (2005). “This Court

Rule 56 summary judgment grants.” Paslay

Idaho 866, 868, 406 P.3d 878, 880 (2017).

make

all

Ins. C0.,

draw

all

v.

A & B Irrigation Dist,

162

A reviewing court Will construe all disputed facts and

reasonable inferences in favor 0f the nonmoving party. Sprinkler

Irr.

C0.

v.

John Deere

139 Idaho 691, 695-96, 85 P.3d 667, 671-72 (2004). The reviewing court will also
reasonable inferences and conclusions in favor of the party opposing the motion.

LLC v. New Sweden Irr.

Dist, 161 Idaho 89, 91, 383 P.3d 1259, 1261 (2016). The

judgment standards were succinctly explained by the Idaho Supreme Court

Lockwood Engineering,

When reviewing an order for summary judgment,

this

Court

same standard of review that was used by the trial court
on the motion for summary judgment. Summary
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on ﬁle, together With the afﬁdavits, if any, show that there is n0
genuine issue as t0 any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled t0 a judgment as a matter 0f law." I.R.C.P. 56(0). The
burden is 0n the moving party t0 show that there are no genuine
issues of material fact. "If there is n0 genuine issue 0f material
fact, only a question of law remains, over which this Court
applies the
in ruling

exercises free review." Id. p. 101 (internal citations omitted).
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summary

in Vreeken

B. V., 148 Idaho 89 (2009):

CNW,

v.

Argument

&
&

III Failed t0
(A) The District Court Erred in Finding that Plaintiff’s Counts II
III are
complv With the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) since Counts II

Contract and Trust Claims, Not Subiect t0 the Notice Requirement of ITCA.

The

district court erred in

dismissing Bliss’ claims for breach 0f ﬁduciary duty and

trespass because both claims are not subj ect to the notice requirement of ITCA. "The Idaho Tort

Claims Act, LC. §§6-901 t0 929, governs the

liability

0f government

entities

and

political

subdivisions for damages arising out 0f negligent 0r otherwise wrongful acts 0r omissions.” LC.

§6-903; City

ofChubbuck v.

City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 203 (1995).

does not apply to claims for contract breaches. City ofChubbuck

upon

rights held

and responsibilities due under a

issue 0f the applicability 0f the

.

.

.

contract,

ITCA. County ofKootenai

v.

at

it is

However, the ITCA

203. If an action

is

based

unnecessary to pursue the

Western Casually

& Surely C0.,

113 Idaho 908, 916 (1988). There are three types of contractual arrangements: First

is

the

express contract wherein the parties expressly agree regarding a transaction; Second there

implied in fact contract wherein there

is

no express agreement but the conduct of the

implies an agreement from which an obligation in contract exists; and Third

in

law

contract, or quasi contract,

for the purposes

agreement 0f the
v.

Pellandz'ni,

Which

is

not a contract at

all,

when

the

parties

called an implied

but an obligation imposed by law

of bringing about justice and equity without reference to the intent or the
parties,

and

in

some cases

in spite

0f an agreement between the

parties.

Peavy

97 Idaho 655, 658, 551 P.2d 610, 613 (1976).

County ofKootenai dealt with an insurer’s responsibility
contract

is

is

t0

pay under an insurance

a sheriff’s ofﬁce conducted an improper execution sale.

refused t0 apply the

ITCA reasoning

Supreme Court refused

it

was

I_d.

inapplicable in a contract case.

to address the applicability

22

0f the ITCA.

I_d.

The lower court
I_d.

The Idaho

Similarly, the case 0f Wickstrom

is

also instructive

and 0n

Id. at

were enrolled

Maintenance Mechanic

in a

45 1 156. The school bulletin stated that upon completion of
,

would be qualiﬁed

discovered that such was not the case.
level

N. Idaho C011,, 111 Idaho 450, 725 P.2d 155 (1986),

point. In Wickstrom, students

course at North Idaho College.
the course, the students

v.

journeymen, the students sent a

Id.

as entry-level

Upon

letter

journeyman; however, the students

discovering that they did not qualify as entry-

of demand “detailing appellants' dissatisfaction with

the course and their intent to take legal action if the college did not compensate

sacriﬁces

made

The
and omitted

in attending the course for eleven

suit alleged that the instructor “willfully,

t0 properly

and adequately

knowledge 0f the defendant college.”

On appeal,
as the appellants

the Idaho

knowingly and intentionally

summary judgment.

Id.

The

had “failed

was never intended

contract. Id. at 452, 157.

exists if the terms

complied With.

Id.

t0

had brought a claim

to

in contract. Id.

stated that as t0

any

tort

suit. Id.

failed,

by their own admission,

and

Court, in dismissing the

tort

and

rej ected

the

students appealed. Id.

claim that existed was moot

comply With the notice provision 0f the I.T.C.A. (LC.

that

refused

t0 dismiss the claim,

trial

The

for

With the consent and

The college brought a motion

Supreme Court

However, the Court noted

sent

The students ﬁled

found that the students had only brought a claim that sounded in

students’ contention that they

Id.

Id.

the matters set forth

instruct

Id.

the Court treated the motion as one for

case,

months.”

them

the students’

demand

§

6—907).”

letter that

was

be a notice 0f tort claim and that the students’ cause 0f action was in

The Idaho Supreme Court

stated that a valid cause of action in contract

of the implied contract between appellants and North Idaho College were not

However, the Idaho Supreme Court noted

nor the complaint adequately stated a claim in contract.
Idaho Supreme Court took the following action:
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Id. at

that neither the appellate record

453. In resolving this case, the

Accordingly,
ﬁle an

we

Which

grant appellants fourteen (14) days in

amended complaint, but

limit such grant only to

t0

an

opportunity to state a cause of action in contract, provided such
exists.

For the reasons

stated, the trial court's ruling that appellant's

claims in tort are barred by applicable provisions of the Idaho Tort
Claims Act is afﬁrmed. Its ruling that appellants did not state a

cause 0f action in contract

is

afﬁrmed, With appellants nevertheless

being granted fourteen (14) days following remittitur in which to
ﬁle an amended complaint in an attempt t0 state a cause 0f action
in contract. Id. at

What Wickstrom

453 (emphasis added).

clearly indicates

Of course,

requirements 0f the ITCA.

this

is

that contract claims are not subj ect t0 the notice

merely acknowledges the obvious since

Claims Act, not the Contract Claims Act. In Bliss’ case, the
the claim that

MID had failed t0 properly operate,

district court erred

maintain or repair

its

III

(Trespass)

was

directly contrary t0 the

the Tort

by ﬁnding

canal or laterals

claim. (R, p.421). Hence, the district court’s ruling dismissing Mr. Bliss’

Fiduciary Duty) and Count

it is

Count

II

is

that

a tort

(Breach of

law 0f Wickstrom and

County ofKootenai.
Just as in Wickstrom

and

is

owed

duties

where the school owed contractual duties

by MID under

Bliss’

-Trespass claim, which emanate from

water

Count

II -

t0 its students, Bliss’

Breach of Fiduciary Duty claim and Count

MID’S implied

contract and trust holder duties 0f Bliss’

rights.

Whenever any waters have been,

0r shall be, appropriated 0r used

for agricultural purposes, under a sale, rental, 0r distribution
thereof, such sale, rental, or distribution shall

be deemed an

exclusive dedication t0 such use; and Whenever such waters so

dedicated shall have once been sold, rented 0r distributed to any

person

who

has settled upon 0r improved land for agricultural

purposes With the View 0f receiving the beneﬁt 0f such water under

such dedication, such person, his

heirs, executors, administrators,

successors, 0r assigns, shall not thereafter without his consent, be

deprived 0f the annual use of the same,

When needed

for domestic

purposes, 0r t0 irrigate to the land so settled upon 0r improved,

upon payment

therefor,

and compliance with such equitable terms
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was
III

and conditions as
prescribed

“The
holding
law.”

title

by

Bradshaw

v.

holder of legal

VP’Ship

v.

fact exists

title

irrigation district as a unit,

District, 85

entity,

set forth in that

a ﬁduciary duty relationship in Which the trustee

n0 express agreement but the
’n v.

and as a legal

Idaho 528, 547, 381 P.2d 440, 450-1

City ofHayden,

parties’

is

the

0f the beneﬁciary.” Dbsi/Tri

P’ship v Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 809, 948 P.2d 151 (1997).
is

may be

and purposes

rights in trust for the uses

to the property subj ect to the beneﬁcial interest

Where there

failure

and water

“A trust creates

N. Idaho Bldg. Contrs. Ass

The

law regards the

Milner Low Lift Irrigation

(1963) (emphasis added).

used and times of use, as

law. Idaho Constitution, art.15, §4

irrigation district

t0 its property

t0 the quantity

A contract implied in

conduct evidences an agreement.

432 P.3d 976, 989, 423 P.3d 976, 989 (2018).

of the Manager of the State Insurance Fund to comply with Idaho code sections t0

distribute dividends to policyholders

was grounded

in contract.

Farber

Idaho State

v.

Ins.

Fund,

152 Idaho 495, 497, 272 P.3d 467 (2012).
Similarly, Bliss’ causes 0f action for

in implied contract

trust for

him

and

trust

law Where

Breach 0f Fiduciary Duty and Trespass are sounded

MID holds the water rights,

to receive the beneﬁt. Just as a

trustee

of legal

title

Bliss.

its

MID has the

of Bliss in

implied contractual obligation t0

canal system and deliver

it

t0 Bliss. Just as a

to property holds title subj ect to the beneﬁcial interest

MID holds water rights,

etc.

manager of an insurance fund has a contractual

obligation t0 distribute dividends to policyholders,

distribute water belonging t0 Bliss through

easements,

of the beneﬁciary,

easements and rights-of—way subj ect t0 the beneﬁcial interest of member

MID obtains their authority t0 be present 0n Bliss’

their contracts entered into

property, 0r lack thereof, pursuant t0

with the Bureau of Reclamation. These contractual rights and

obligations suppose Bliss as the ultimate beneﬁciary of the water rights, and hence a protected

party under the contracts.
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The

district court cited

duty and trespass are

torts. (R,

two cases

for

p.421) (See Pioneer Irr. Dist.

599, 288 P.3d 810, 816 (2012); Stephenson

However, the premise announced

(1930)).

support that Bliss’ claims for breach 0f ﬁduciary

its

v.

v.

City ofCaldwell, 153 Idaho 593,

Pioneer Irr. Dist, 49 Idaho 189, 288

421

P.

of this case

in Stevenson does not apply t0 the facts

because Bliss brought his two causes 0f action for breach of ﬁduciary duty and trespass,
distinctly

and separately from any

common negligence theory.

of action on the implied contract between

MID

and Bliss for the water,

“Under the provisions 0f C.S., §4350 (now

rights.

I.C.A., §42-3

1

irrigation

is

property

held in trust

dedicated t0 and set apart to the use and purposes provided by law.” Lewiston Orchards

Dist.

Stephenson recognizes

irrigation district possesses

irrigation canals

Stephenson

at 195,

owner; one

Who

in his

288

P. at

functions

.

.

.

the construction

423 (emphasis added). “Proprietary” means
title

t0 a thing;

one

who

1219

(6th ed.

1990).

However,

irrigation

district

and

is

by the

held in trust

purposes provided by law.” Nelson

Gem Irr.

[irrigation] district

v.

for,

to,

.

title

to a thing

own right.”

easements and rights—of—way

288 P.3d

at 819.

by operation 0f law

dedicated

.”
.

“[a] proprietor or

possesses the dominion or ownership of a thing in his

legal title to all property acquired

v.

and operation 0f

possesses or holds the

are not exclusive t0 an irrigation district. Pioneer Irr. Dist. at 602,

immediately in the

“[c]0nceding that an

a proprietary rather than a governmental function

is

has the exclusive

Law Dictionary,

this difference, stating,

some governmental

and ditches

own right; one Who

Black’s

Yaden

Irr.

Gilmore, 53 Idaho 377, 380-1, 23 P.2d 720, 721 (1933).

v.

Interestingly,

its

and easement

1) the legal title to all

acquired by the district by operation of law vests immediately in the district and
for,

two causes

Bliss premised these

and

And “.

.

.

the

vests

set apart t0 the

use and

Pehrson, 148 Idaho 157, 162, 219 P.3d 809 (2009) (citing

Dist, 37 Idaho 300, 308, 216 P.250, 252 (1923)) (emphasis added).
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Bliss’ counts for

law and hence the

Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Trespass are sounded in

ITCA

does not apply.

delivery and certain easements, Bliss

distinct

is

As

a

member 0f MID and landowner

owed ﬁduciary and

ITCA

erred as a matter 0f law in holding that the

and contract

entitled t0

water

contractual duties separate and

MID t0 the general public.

from ordinary negligence duties owed by

trust

The

trial

court

did apply to these two claims and that decision

should be reversed.

(B)

The

District

with the

Even

if the

Court Erred

in

Finding that Plaintiff’s Notices Failed t0 Complv

ITCA since the District Court Failed t0 Address All 0f the Notices.

ITCA

applies t0 Counts

II

and

III,

Bliss ﬁled several notices With

MID that

separately and cumulatively satisfy the Idaho Tort Claims Act. (R., p.301-303, 305-3 16).

LC.

§

6-906 provides,
A11 Claims against a political subdivision [subdivision] arising

under the provisions 0f this act

.

.

.

shall

be presented to and ﬁled

With the clerk 0r secretary 0f the political subdivision Within one

hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or
reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later.
Irrigation districts are included in the deﬁnition

91 (citing LC. §6-902(2)).
invalid or insufﬁcient

“A

CNW, LLC at

claim ﬁled under the provisions 0f this section shall not be held

by reason 0f inaccuracy

claim, or otherwise, unless

of political subdivisions.

it is

shown that

in stating the time, place, nature or cause

the governmental entity

was

in fact misled t0

0f the
its

injury thereby.” LC. §6-907. This Court has stated the following in analyzing the notice required

under the ITCA:
Idaho Code section 73-102 instructs that the complied laws

which they
relate, and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to
be liberally construed, With a View to effect their obj ects and t0
promote justice. Thus, this Court has consistently taken a liberal
approach t0 interpreting the notice requirement 0f the ITCA.”
establish the

law of this

CNW, LLC at 92

state respecting the subjects t0

(citations

and quotations omitted).
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A claim need not be personally served on the secretary of the district, but rather a claim
that has

been delivered

delivery requirement under

“[W]hen

who

ofﬁce and brought to the attention 0f the secretary meets the notice

t0 the

ITCA. Huﬂv. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274, 277, 647 P.2d 730, 733 (1982).

the notice 0f tort claim

is

delivered t0 an employee 0r agent 0f the governmental entity

then delivers the notice t0 the clerk 0r secretary”, the requirements 0f the

satisﬁed.

CNW, LLC at

Smith, that

“.
.

ITCA

are

93, 383 P.3d 1263. Furthermore, this court rejected the argument in

except for those circumstances listed in the statute, personal submission of the

.

Claim by the claimant himself is the sole and exclusive method 0f compliance.” Smith
Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 624, 586 P.2d 1062, 1068.

summary judgment granted to
notice 0f claim

t0 its injury.”

would be

Smith

at

.

.

the governmental entity. Id.

The Smith Court

insufﬁcient only if the city can establish that

MID’S

secretary

to Bliss’ injuries.

constructive and actual notices t0

the district court

further stated that a

it

was thereby misled

was acutely aware 0f Bliss’ claims and

The record shows

that

know 0f all 0f Bliss’

MID

notice and opportunity t0

know Bliss’

pp.306, 3 10-1

MID

315-16).

claims against

has not

MID had ample written, verbal,

complaints against

MID,

yet the

court ignored most 0f the written notices and responses entirely. (R, pp.305-316).

1,

City 0f

623, 586 P.2d 1062, 1067 (emphasis added).

In this instance,

been misled as

“.

The Smith Court reversed

v.

MID, even responding t0

trial

MID had

his claims. (R,

employees/ directors even traveled t0 Bliss’ property t0 View

ﬁrst-hand his complaints/claims. (R, p.251 (P.20, L.21 t0 P.21, L.1

1);

p.260 (P.10, L.8-14);

p.296 (P.102, L.14 t0 P.103, L.7)).
Bliss begin sending his written notices with the delivery 0f his statement

2015. (R, p.305).
12,

When a correspondence was

sent

2015, Bliss sent another notice 0n September

9,

28

by MID’S

attorney,

2015 through

0n July 23,

Mr. Fletcher 0n August

his attorney’s ofﬁce t0

Mr.

Fletcher. (R, pp.306—309).

When another correspondence was

Fletcher, yet again, Bliss sent a third notice to Mr. Fletcher

3 14).

On February 28,

2017, Bliss sent another notice to

four (4) separate notices sent to

sent

0n October 20, 2015 by Mr.

0n November 23, 2015.

MID.

MID that comply with Bliss’

(R, pp.301-303). In

Visits,

letter.

all, at

least

notice requirements under the

Idaho Tort Claims Act, but only one of which was ever addressed by the

February 28, 2017

(R., pp.3 10-

trial court, i.e.

the

(R, pp.301-303). Furthermore, the trial court ignored the personal

inspections and evidence gathering 0f MID to Bliss’ property

by

directors

and employees.

(R, p.251 (P.20, L.21 to P.21, L.1 1); p.260 (P.10, L.8-14); p.296 (P.102, L.14 t0 P.103, L.7))

“The primary function of notice under the ITCA
that a claim against

it is

is

being prosecuted and thus apprise

perhaps prepare a defense.” Blass

v.

t0 put the

it

government

entity

on notice

0f the need t0 preserve evidence and

County ofTwin Falls, 132 Idaho 451, 452-53, 974 P.2d

503, 504-05 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith at 621, 586 P.2d at 1065.
In this case, Bliss and his attorney have contacted

MID

and/or

its

attorney in at least four (4)

different written notices, regarding Bliss’ claims. (R., p.304-16). Furthermore,

Directors admit that

Lastly,

some 0f Bliss’ claims

MID’S Board of

are meritorious. (R, p.265 (P.34, L.5-22), p.285).

MID Board members and employees Visited the Bliss property to investigate

document the claims.

and

(R, p.251 (P.20, L.21 to P.21, L.1 1); p.260 (P.10, L.8-14); p.296 (P.102,

L.14 to P.103, L.7)).
Similar t0 Bliss’ case

is

Cox

v.

City ofSandpoint, 140 Idaho 127, 9O P.3d 352 (Ct. App.

2003), wherein the city 0f Sandpoint tried t0 argue for dismissal of claims under

which

refers

back

t0 the requirements

I.

C. §50-219,

of LC. §9-600 Idaho Tort Claims Against Governmental

Entities (hereafter

“ITCA”). Sandpoint argued that Cox had failed

ITCA.

Cox ’s correspondence regarding his claims began between Cox’s

Id. at 129.
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to ﬁle a claim pursuant t0

attorney and

the City of Sandpoint’s attorneys in 1993. Id.

their dispute until

Cox ﬁled

The

parties continued negotiations trying t0 resolve

suit against the city in

2001.

The record does not provide any

Id.

additional information about correspondence or formal notice given

commencing the

City other than billing statements

Cox

Court in Cox found that “There

n0 express format

is

sent prior t0

for a claim

between Cox and Sandpoint

The

action against the city.

under the ITCA.”

Id. at

a result of the attorneys of the parties engaging in discussions, the Court found that

13

1.

As

Cox had

reasonably put the City 0f Sandpoint 0n notice because the City was aware 0f Cox’s claims and
the need t0 preserve evidence and prepare a defense. Id. at 132.

vacating the

summary judgment ruling and remanding

it

The Court concluded by

t0 the district court,

awarding Cox

attorney’s fees for the appeal. Id.

Similarly, in this case Bliss

and

his

Counsel have been in negotiation With MID’S

attorney in an attempt to resolve Bliss’ disputes with

MID.

Bliss

and

his

four (4) different written notices. (R., pp.305-3 16). Like the

Cox

not being able to reach a resolution to their differences, Bliss

was forced

against

MID for MID’S past and continued breaches, bad acts

they have no notice, especially since

he received with the

1,

Bliss’ claims

3 15-16, 360-2).

Bliss property t0 investigate

to

commence

MID

this action

cannot claim

attorney discussed the notices and correspondence

and

And, since

at least

case, as a result of the parties

and behavior.

MID Board as reﬂected in board minutes,

MID’s insurance regarding
p.306, 3 10-1

MID’S

Counsel sent

letters

MID

letters

0f correspondence from

between the attorneys themselves.

Board members and employees

and document the claims. (R, p.251 (P.20, L.21

(R.,

Visited the

to P.21, L.1 1);

p.260 (P.IO, L.8-14); p.296 (P.102, L.14 to P.103, L.7)).

Defendant had actual notices 0f Plaintiff” s claims.

MID where they were discussed by Mr.

Plaintiff” s

claims were submitted t0

Davidson, Ms. Bailes, Mr. Fletcher,

3O

ICRMP

and the

Board. The claims were even written into minutes 0f the board meetings and

Manager and Board of Directors

t0 Bliss’ property t0

View and

MID

sent their

own

investigate Bliss’ claims.

Idaho courts have clearly pointed out the purpose of the notice requirement as follows:
“(1) save needless expense

the differences

between the

and

litigation

parties, (2)

by providing an opportunity

allow authorities t0 conduct a

cause of the injury in order to determine the extent 0f the state’s
the state t0 prepare defenses.” Mitchell

P.2d 544, 548 (1997) quoting Pounds
(1991)). These purposes have all

v.

v.

liability, if

been met because

full investigation into the injuries

MID

and Bliss have been provided

0f Bliss and gather evidence t0 prepare their defense.

Directors to Bliss’ property t0 investigate his claims.

P.285).

also Visited Bliss’ property,

MID has had ample notices

the various array of

acknowledges

and opportunities

entirely.

claims, however,

MID

sent their

MID has

Board 0f

Former Chairman of the Board Frank
that Bliss has legitimate complaints. (R,

t0 investigate Bliss’ claims as evidence

MID principles and agents involved in reviewing,

investigating, and/or

any, and (3) allow

MID has been allowed sufﬁcient time t0

simply refused t0 redress the claims 0r has denied them

who

the

Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426-27, 816 P.2d 982, 983-84

MID has had ample notice and opportunity t0 resolve Bliss’

Hunt,

ﬁlll investigation into

0f

Bingham Memorial Hosp, 130 Idaho 420, 424, 942

opportunity t0 amicable resolve their differences,

conduct a

for amicable resolution

by

analyzing, discussing,

denying those claims.

The record shows

that

MID had at least four (4) written notices

evidencing Bliss’ claims

and complaints against MID. Therefore, Bliss has satisﬁed the notice requirements under the
Idaho Tort Claims Act. The

trial

court erred in granting

decision should be reversed.
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Summary Judgment and the

trial

court’s

2.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT BLISS FAILED TO
ESTABLISH A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY.

Introduction

After the district court errantly concluded that Bliss did not satisfy the ITCA, the district
court took the next step and further ruled that

Bliss; rather

MID

did not

owe any

identiﬁed ﬁduciary duty to

only general duties under a negligence standard. (R, p.423).

Standard ofReview

An Appeals
standard applied

all

Irr.

Court reviews a

by the

disputed facts and

trial court.

make

all

trial court's

Read at

grant 0f summary judgment under the

499, 112 P.3d at 787.

same

A reviewing court will construe

reasonable inferences in favor 0f the nonmoving party. Sprinkler

C0. at 695-96, 85 P.3d at 671-72.

The summary judgment standards were succinctly

explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in Vreeken at 89:

When reviewing an order for summary judgment,

this

Court

same standard 0f review that was used by the trial court
on the motion for summary judgment. Summary
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
0n ﬁle, together with the afﬁdavits, if any, show that there is n0
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled t0 a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(0). The
burden is 0n the moving party to show that there are n0 genuine
issues of material fact. "If there is no genuine issue of material
fact, only a question of law remains, over Which this Court
applies the
in ruling

exercises free review." Id. p. 101 (internal citations omitted).

Legal Argument

The

trial

court erred

by ﬁnding

clear constitutional, statutory

t0 the

members they

as a matter of law in

that

MID owed no

and case law substantiating

ﬁduciary duty to Bliss
irrigation districts

serve because the districts hold water in

its

trust.

analysis of ﬁduciary duties and negligence.
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The

when there

is

owe ﬁduciary duties

trial

court further erred

In a relatively recent decision, the Idaho

relationship

Mort.

,

Supreme Court discussed and analyzed

between parties Which create a ﬁduciary duty and breach. Skinner

159 Idaho 642 (2016) "In order

plaintiff must establish that defendants

the ﬁduciary duty

was breached.”

'[t]o

owed plaintiff a ﬁduciary duty and that

Id. at

647

(citing

Bushi
v.

v.

Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho

THI C0,, 140 Idaho

503, 511 (2004)). "[A] claim for a breach 0f a ﬁduciary duty

Leroy,

"[a]

is

created

by the

Coﬁn & Matthews,

ﬁduciary duty

is

relationship

between the

is

a negligence action in

parties." Id. (citing

from a simple

Davidson Trust C0., 151 Idaho 701, 706, 263 P.3d 755, 760 (201
"Whether a ﬁduciary relationship

relationships are

commonly

exists is a question

characterized

v.

However,

Id.

(citing

0f law."

149 Idaho 423, 428, 234 P.3d 747, 752 (2010)).
technical relation created

special

good

conﬁdence imposed

faith

125 Idaho

0r

deﬁned

in another

and with due regard
at

by

Who,

“A

Id. (citing

0r authority in the hands

Country Cove Dev.,

in law, but

it

exists in cases

840—41 (1952)).
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v.

Sargent,

where there has been a

and good conscience,

is

0f one reposing the confidence.”

614, 873 P.2d at 868 (quoting Stems

v.

Inc.

ﬁduciary relationship does not depend upon

in equity

t0 the interest

Beaudoin

“Fiduciary

Id.

May, 143 Idaho 595, 603, 150 P.3d 288, 296 (2006); High Valley Concrete, L.L.C.

some

Runft,

1)).

by one party placing property

0f another, or being authorized t0 act 0n behalf of the other."
v.

Jones

which

duty in the negligence context, and ﬁnding an

tort

assumed ﬁduciary duty requires more than a mere voluntary undertaking."
v.

253, 261, 92 P.3d

Chtd., 125 Idaho 607, 614, 873 P.2d 861, 868 (1994)).

distinct

Bank

U.S.

establish a claim for breach 0f ﬁduciary duty, [a]

764, 769, 203 P.3d 694, 699 (2009)) (quoting Talley

the duty t0 act

v.

the

bound

to act in

Id. (citing

Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 288,

Jones,

240 P.2d 833,

“The term ﬁduciary implies

that

one party

is

in a superior position t0 the other

such a position enables him t0 exercise inﬂuence over one

him

As

Who

a general rule, mere respect for another's judgment or trust in this

in

character

usually not sufﬁcient t0 establish such a relationship. Thefacts

is

.

.

that

reposes special trust and

conﬁdence

.

and

must indicate that the one reposing the
advice orpresenting arguments

trust

hasfoundationfor his beliefthat the one giving

acting not in his

is

and circumstances

own

behalf, but in the interests 0fthe other

party.” Id. (citing

High Valley Concrete

original) (quoting

Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Ina, 121 Idaho 266, 278, 824

at

428, 234 P.3d at 752 (alteration and emphasis in

P.2d 841, 853 (1991)).
Thus, examples of relationships from Which the law Will impose ﬁduciary obligations 0n
the parties include

client,

When

the parties are:

members 0f the same

family, partners, attorney and

executor and beneﬁciary of an estate, principal and agent, insurer and insured, 0r close

friends. Id. at

648 (quoting Wade Baker

& Sons Farms v.

Corp. ofPresiding Bishop ofChurch 0f

Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 136 Idaho 922, 928, 42 P.3d 715, 721 (Ct. App. 2002)).
In contrast t0 these relationships, Idaho has long held that there

created solely

by the

relationship

Racquetball Club, Inc.

v.

between a bank and

its

customer.

is

no ﬁduciary duty

Id. (citing

Black Canyon

Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 176, 804 P.2d 900, 905

(1991)). Notwithstanding however, a

ﬁduciary duties to a customer for

bank holding escrowed insurance funds does owes

Whom those

funds are held.

Id. at

648.

A “duty devolves upon the ditch company t0 maintain and keep in repair its ditches, canals
and

laterals.”

Niday

v.

Barker, et

al.,

16 Idaho 73, 80 (1909). Niday involved a water user

instigated an action against a director 0f the

deliver 80 inches of water

from the

Nampa and Meridian

district’s canal to
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Niday.

who

Irrigation District for failing t0

Id. at 75.

Niday had used this amount

0f water in previous years.
district to deliver

requires

it

water t0 Niday, the Supreme Court stated the duty imposed upon a water

to maintain

Similarly,

and keep

MID owes

lateral canal is located, to

irrigation district

its

In upholding the lower’s court’s decision t0 force the water

Id. at 76.

and

their ditches, canals

laterals in repair. Id. 75, 80-1.

a duty to Bliss, as a water user and landowner

maintain and keep

law regards the

its

ditches, canals

irrigation district as a unit,

and

upon

Whom the MID

and as a legal

547, 381 P.2d at 449-50 (Citing I.C. §§ 43-101, 43-316; Gedney

v.

entity,

holding

Colbum

v.

’

Farmers C0-0peratz've Ditch C0.
(1908)).

“The

Riverside

v.

Irr.

legal title t0 all property acquired

vests immediately in the district

and

purposes provided by law.” Nelson

is

at

at

Wilson, 24 Idaho

and

company.”

Big Lost River Irr. Dist, 148 Idaho 157, 162, 219 P.3d 804, 809 (2009)

v.

Bradshaw

in the ditch operated for sale, rental,

distribution 0f waters does not belong t0 the water users, but rather t0 the ditch

Nelson

to

title

Snake River Irr. Dist, 61

Idaho 605, 104 P.2d 909 (1940); Yaden, 37 Idaho 300, 216 P. 250;

“The appropriation 0f waters carried

“The

laterals in repair.

property and water rights in trust for the uses and purposes set forth in that law.”

94, 132 P. 579).

district

(citing

Dist, 14 Idaho 450, 458-59, 94 P. 761, 763

by

held in trust

the irrigation district

for,

dedicated

162 (citing Yaden

v.

t0,

Gem Irr.

and

by operation of law
set apart t0 the

use and

Dist, 37 Idaho 300, 308, 216

P.250, 252 (1923)).

The

district court erred

maintain and repair

keep

its

ditches, canals

water rights in

by the

its

district

Dist. at 383,

trust.

canal system, since

and

that

its

laterals in repair,

MID

has a general not ﬁduciary duty t0 operate,

ﬁnding

is

contrary t0

and contrary

to

MID’S duty

t0 maintain

in trust for the land

at 722.

The

owners Within

district court correctly

35

its

and

MID holding title t0 its property and

“In this jurisdiction (Idaho) the property 0f an irrigation district

and held

23 P.2d

by ﬁnding

.

.

.

is

owned

boundaries.” Lewiston Orchards

Irr.

noted that there were no allegations of

claim t0 show

MID was using its water outside 0f it boundaries.

and ignores the clear examples 0f breached ﬁduciary duties
boundaries Without consent

is

only one manner in which a

Another breach 0f ﬁduciary duty

is

which he

t0

ditches, canals

in this case.

district

misses the mark

Using water outside 0f

may breach

its

and

is

failing to use that

laterals in repair,

and

money

ﬁduciary duty.

MID

receiving

t0 properly

failing to deliver Bliss the

.

.The

authority

district

whose lands

is

created

holds

title

the water has

by

statute.

to the

“These constitutional provisions apply

water rights

become dedicated by

in trust for the

water to

381 P.2d

at

449—50 quoting

Nampa & Meridian

application thereon t0 a beneﬁcial use, have

Irr. Dist. v.

100 A.L.R. 557. Similar to statute granting authority t0 a

MID has been
assessments

t0 irrigation

landowners. The landowners,

acquired the status and rights of distributees under Const, Art 15 §§ 4 and

5.

Bradshaw

MID

is

at 545,

Barclay, 56 Idaho 13, 47 P.2d 916,

trustee, t0 act

0n behalf 0f a beneﬁciary,

granted authority and has a duty to act on behalf 0f the district’s landowners. The

MID

is

paid

is

t0

be used for the beneﬁt of the landowners by allowing

maintain canals and ditches and provide for water t0 be delivered t0 the landowners 0f the
If

and

is entitled.

MID’S
districts.

its

this analysis

evident from the facts 0f this case, whereby

and holding assessments and fees from landowners
adequately keep

But

not maintaining

its

MID

to

district.

ditches and canals or failing to deliver water t0 the landowners, then

MID is not fulﬁlling its ﬁduciary duties imposed by law. MID’S exclusive authority and monopoly
on delivering water to
as with all

MID

its

landowners should closely adhere t0 duties imposed by

monopolies there

is little

state statute since

incentive to provide better service at a cheaper cost.

Since

holds quasi-governmental authority, the courts are the landowners only remedy to question

Whether

MID

is

in fact fulﬁlling the

The use of landowners’

ﬁduciary duties and obligations

MID

properties (easements for ditches and canals) and
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owes the landowner.

money (assessments paid

to

MID)

create a ﬁduciary relationship in

their best interests

3.

by adhering

which landowners depend 0n

t0 the ﬁduciary duties

MID

to act according to

and obligations.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO
ESTABLISH A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO THE CLAIM OF
WRONGFUL PROSECUTION.

Introduction

The

district court

made two

errant conclusions: (1) Bliss

element that the case was terminated in his favor

.

.

.”;

“
.

.

.

cannot show an essential

(2) Bliss “has not presented

admissible evidence to rebut the presumption that there

was n0 malice

0r criminal intent

Additionally, the district court applied an incorrect standard 0f proof on

errantly granted

MID’S motion

for

any
.”
.

.

summary judgment and

summary judgment.

Standard ofReview

An Appeals
standard applied

all

Irr.

Court reviews a

by the

disputed facts and

trial court.

make

all

trial court's

Read at

grant 0f summary judgment under the

499, 112 P.3d at 787.

same

A reviewing court will construe

reasonable inferences in favor 0f the nonmoving party. Sprinkler

C0. at 695-96, 85 P.3d at 671-72.

The summary judgment standards were succinctly

explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in Vreeken, 148 Idaho 89:

When reviewing an order for summary judgment,

this

Court

same standard 0f review that was used by the trial court
on the motion for summary judgment. Summary
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
0n ﬁle, together with the afﬁdavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled t0 a judgment as a matter 0f law." I.R.C.P. 56(0). The
burden is on the moving party t0 show that there are no genuine
issues 0f material fact. "If there is no genuine issue of material
fact, only a question of law remains, over Which this Court
applies the
in ruling

exercises free review." Id. p. 101 (internal citations omitted).
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“T0 prove malicious prosecution a plaintiff must make a prima

facie

showing of six

elements: (1) prosecution 0f the plaintiff; (2) termination of the prosecution in favor 0f the
plaintiff; (3) that the

defendant instigated the prosecution; (4) malice; (5) that there was a lack of

probable cause; and (6) that the plaintiff sustained damages.” Shannahan
664, 667, 962 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1998); Herrold

v.

v.

Gigray, 131 Idaho

Idaho State Sch. For Deaf& Blind, 112 Idaho

410, 41 1-12 (1987). The district court summarily dismissed Bliss’ claim based upon elements
(2) termination

0f the prosecution in favor of the

“The basis

for

damages

in this kind

plaintiff,

and

(4) malice.

of an action (Malicious Prosecution)

is,

0f course, the

shame, humiliation, and actual injury to one's reputation and business, physical injury,

and expenses sustained by the

false arrest, that

is,

arrest

if

Without probable cause.” Luther

any
v.

.

.

.

First

Bank, 64 Idaho 416, 421, 133 P.2d 717, 720 (1943)

Legal Argument
(A) Termination in Favor 0f Bliss.

The
the case

trial

court erred

was terminated

dismissed

when it found that

in his favor

.”
.

.

restitution t0

The

MID

trial

“restitution”

show

“
.

.

.

cannot show an essential element that

The court explained

when the plaintiff paid restitution

plaintiff (Bliss) cannot

Bliss

that the case

in the

was

in

its

sum 0f $75.00

.

ruling that

.

.

“.
.

.

the case

was

[and] Wherefore, the

necessarily dismissed in his favor since he did

pay

as a result 0f the prosecution.” (R, pp.427-8) (emphasis added).

court erred in

was paid by

payment of restitution

t0

Bliss

making these ﬁndings because

when

there

was n0

there

is

n0 evidence

to support

any

guilty plea or conviction. “Orders for the

crime Victims are governed by LC. §19-5304.” State

v.

Cheeney, 144

Idaho 294, 296, 160 P.3d 451, 453 (2007). “Unless the court determines that an order 0f
restitution

would be inappropriate or undesirable,
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it

shall order a

Defendant found guilty of anV

crime which results in economic loss to the Victim t0 make restitution t0 the Victim.” LC. §195304(2) (emphasis added). “Restitution orders shall be entered by the court
.”

sentencing or such later date
require restitution

is

.

.

committed

to the trial court’s discretion.

Cheeney

at

296, 160 P.3d 453.

the boundaries provided

Victim as that term

is

trial

court’s exercise 0f discretion in requiring restitution

by LC. §§19-5304.

used in the

T0

Id.

It is

authority to

must be within
must be a

qualify for restitution, a claimant

statute I.C. §§19-5304(1)(e), (2). Id.

“N0 person can be punished

for a public offense except

having jurisdiction thereof.” LC. §19-101.
in this chapter, is a bar t0

power 0r

to

of a statutory provision to such

direct reparations or restitution to a crime Victim in the absence

Therefore, the

time 0f

LC. §19-5304(6) (emphasis added). The decision Whether

generally recognized, however, that courts 0f criminal jurisdiction have n0

effect. Id.

at the

“An

upon a

legal conviction in a court

order for the dismissal 0f the action, as provided

any other prosecution for the same offense,

LC. §19-3506. Idaho has further recognized that in order for there

to

if it is

be

a misdemeanor

“restitution”, there

.”
.

.

must

be notice to a defendant of the possibility of the court ordering restitution upon a guilty plea.
State

v.

Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 573, 861 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Ct. App. 1993); Hayes

v.

State,

146

Idaho 353, 355-6, 195 P.3d 712, 714-5. The Idaho Appeals Court in Banuelos stated as follows:
Restitution does not turn

0n a defendant’s personal history, but the
from the conviction of a

possibility of restitution stems directly

crime that results in some pecuniary gain to the defendant 0r loss
to the Victim.

We conclude that restitution is a direct consequence

of entering a guilty plea and the sentencing court

upon a defendant Who pleads

may not impose

defendant
advised 0f the possibility prior t0 entering his plea.” State v.

restitution

guilty, unless

is

Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 573, 861 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Ct. App.
1993) (quoting State v. Cameron, 30 Wash.App. 229, 633 P.2d
901, 905 (1981)) (emphasis added).

There

by

Bliss t0

is

MID

n0 evidence sufﬁcient
since there

t0 support the trial court’s

was n0 conviction 0f a
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ﬁnding

that restitution

crime, nor plea 0f guilty

by

Bliss.

was paid

Further,

Bliss

was never notiﬁed by any court of restitution being

a plea 0f guilty entered, nor a conviction. In
the error of its charges

and agreed

order, primarily because there

the opposite occurred

fact,

Where the

State realized

While Bliss does not

t0 dismiss the entire case against Bliss.

contest the fact that his attorney’s ofﬁce paid $75.00 t0

was not

MID through the prosecution attorney’s

ofﬁce, such payment does not ﬁt any deﬁnition 0f restitution under the law, and there has been

n0 ﬁnding made by the court
fact, if

anything, such a

forfeiture, 0r other

why this payment was made, Which is

payment preserved

prosecution because the case

“The omission

as to

the rights of Bliss to sue

MID

a factual dispute. In

for malicious

was dismissed.

to specify 0r

afﬁrm

in this

code any

remedy imposed by law and allowed

to

liability t0

damages, penalty,

be recovered

01‘

enforced in any

civil

action 0r proceeding, for any act 0r omission declared punishable herein, does not affect any
right to recover 0r enforce the same.”

against

MID for its

payment his
that

false

and egregious actions and statements

attorney’s ofﬁce paid to

such payment was for
Therefore the

LC. §18-103. Bliss’ rights

trial

not affected by the $75.00

MID when there is no code section stating or recognizing

restitution,

court erred

is

t0 instigate a civil action

because there was n0 conviction.

by ﬁnding

that Bliss

made

a restitution

payment Which

resulted in the case not terminating in his favor.

(B) Malice 0r criminal intent 0f MID.

The

trial

court erred

by ignoring

the facts relevant t0

looking only at Mr. Hunt’s voluntary statement. (R, p.429).
Bliss under Malicious Prosecution theory if

Shannahan
its

at

MID

MID’S malice

As noted

acted With malice

667, 962 P.2d 105 1; Herrold at 41 1-12.; I.C. §6-904.

01‘

or criminal intent,

above,

MID

is

liable t0

criminal intent. See

“A governmental

entity

and

employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice

4O

0r criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim

which

.

.

.

3. [a]rises

out 0f

.

.

.

malicious

prosecution, abuse 0f process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference With
contract rights.” LC. §6-904.

There

Ruth
all

Bailes,

is

also

n0 dispute

that

MID Chairman Frank Hunt,

Amber Christensen, Vance

and employees Dan Davidson,

Johnson, and David Warr, along With Attorney Fletcher

prepared statements/e-mails instigating the prosecution. (R, p.252 (P25, L.20 t0 P.27, L21),

p.285, p.297 (P.1 14, L.1 t0 P.1 16, L.13), p. 351-2, p.349 (P.75, L.8 t0 P.77, L.16), p.353-8).

MID

employees acted maliciously and with criminal intent When they misrepresented

states that

to

remove

(Bliss)

that

from MID, with the exception 0f Frank Hunt’s statement which

he gave Bliss authority when he told Bliss he needed more water, knowing Bliss had
the lock and chain

would turn

in a little

0n the head

more water

gate.

at the

Mr. Hunt also stated

head 0f the

remove the lock and chain from the head gate
Contrary to the ﬁnding by the

trial

evidence of malice 0r criminal

Amber Christensen, Vance

t0 control the

it is

0f directors 0f an irrigation
sufﬁcient water

may be

district

he

Mr. Hunt’s
to

for

Dan Davidson, Ruth

MID Attorney Fletcher,

LC.

§

direct authority t0 allow Bliss t0

43-304

states speciﬁcally that the

may. .“do any and every lawful act necessary
.

that

intent.

As Chairman of the Board 0f MID, Mr. Hunt had
cavitate.

was

water going past Bliss’ head gate.

Johnson, and David Warr, along with

pump would not

intent

more water he would need

the statements of MID employees

Which show the evidence of malice and/or criminal

the water so that Bliss’

“[m]y

upon the statement of Frank Hunt

court that Bliss relied

intent,

that

ditch.” (R, p.285).

statement shows that he was aware that in order for Bliss to get

Bailes,

about

from Frank Hunt. (R, p.301-2). Each of the statements indicate

the authority granted t0 Bliss

Bliss did not have authority

facts

t0

change
board

be done that

furnished t0 the lands in the district for irrigation purposes.” Mr. Hunt’s
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actions

were

in accordance with

LC. §42-1201 which requires

MID t0 “keep a ﬂow 0f water

therein sufﬁcient to the requirements of such persons as are properly entitled t0 the use 0f water

therefrom.

.”
.

MID
ﬂow

failed to provide sufﬁcient water t0 Bliss;

gave Bliss authority to increase the water

would have sufﬁcient water; and then maliciously sought criminal charges

so that he

against Bliss for exercising the authority he had been granted

and criminal intent on the part 0f MID employees

MID’S malicious

employees misstating

evidence to

harm

Bliss. Bliss

show malice

facts

was harmed

as a result of

actions in drafting false factual statements t0 criminally prosecute him.

called law enforcement, drafted and turned over

MID’S

to

by MID. These

Bliss’ authority,

duplicitous statements

ﬁve

intentionally false statements

MID

from

and then demanded Bliss be criminally prosecuted.

made

in written statements to

law enforcement provide the

malice towards Bliss by trying t0 have criminal charges brought and

illustrate the

prosecuted against Bliss for exercising the authority granted him by Frank Hunt. This malice

and criminal
First,

intent is further

MID made

shown by

other facts ignored

a records request through

its

secretary,

Minidoka Sheriff Deputy’s body camera recording 0f an
present, played

it

members 0f MID

L6;

to

MID

employees and

prior to a

directors,

by the

trial court.

Ruth

Bailes,

altercation whereat

and obtained a
Mr. Bliss was

and then copied and distributed

member vote 0n board members.

(R.,

it

to certain

p.347-349 (P.67, L.20 to P.68,

P.69, L.13 to P.70, L.25; P.71, L.18 to P.75, L.1)). “Public records 0fthe state and/or

territory

of Idaho

.

.

.

may not be

improperly 0r unlawfully transferred 0r removed from their
“.

proper custodian.” I.C. §74-121(1). Generally,

nor chapter 10,

title

59, Idaho Code, shall

.

.

nothing in this chapter [Public Records Act]

be construed t0 require disclosure 0f investigatory

records compiled for law enforcement purposes

by a law enforcement agency

42

.

.

.” I.C.

§74-

124(1).

Yet Ms. Bailes improperly and unlawfully copied and distributed a Video recording of

an altercation Whereat Mr. Bliss was present in a further attempt t0 injury

was outside normal boundaries of decency and outrageous

Bliss.

Such conduct

since an ordinary person does not

afﬁrmatively work to impugn the character and reputation of another person, especially one for

Which she performs duties
Bliss about holding

“shocked”

him

Bliss. (R,

MID’s

of MID. Second,

for, as secretary

in

Dan Davidson made

statements to

lower esteem as a result of the charges Bliss had received and that

p.245 (P.138, L.17 t0 P.139, L.3)).

multiple false statements,

Bliss through releasing a

attempt t0 have Bliss prosecuted, the belittlement 0f

law enforcement Video

Dan Davidson holding Bliss
establish material facts

its

in a

members, and

its

statements through

lower esteem because 0f criminal charges he received,

Which show an

behalf of MID. Therefore,

t0 district

all

issue 0f fact relating t0 malice and/or criminal intent

summary judgment was

inappropriately granted and the

trial

0n

court’s

ruling should be reversed.

4.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINITIFF FAILED TO
ESTABLISH A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO THE CLAIM OF

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
Issue

The

district court erred

by ﬁnding

that Bliss

had presented no evidence

that

he has

suffered “severe emotional distress”. (R, p.430).

Standard ofReview

An Appeals
standard applied

all

Court reviews a

by the

disputed facts and

trial court.

make

all

trial court's

Read at

grant 0f summary judgment under the

499, 112 P.3d at 787.

same

A reviewing court will construe

reasonable inferences in favor 0f the nonmoving party. Sprinkler
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Irr.

C0. at 695-96, 85 P.3d at 671-72.

The summary judgment standards were succinctly

explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in Vreeken, 148 Idaho 89 (2009):

When reviewing an order for summary judgment,

this

Court

same standard 0f review that was used by the trial court
on the motion for summary judgment. Summary
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on ﬁle, together With the afﬁdavits, if any, show that there is n0
genuine issue as t0 any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(0). The
burden is 0n the moving party to show that there are n0 genuine
issues 0f material fact. "If there is no genuine issue of material
fact, only a question of law remains, over Which this Court
applies the
in ruling

exercises free review." Id. p. 101 (internal citations omitted).

Legal Argument

T0
show

establish a claim for intentional inﬂiction 0f emotional distress (IIED), a plaintiff must

(1) defendant’s

outrageous; (3) there

conduct was intentional 0r reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and

was a

causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the plaintiff s

emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe. Johnson
455, 464, 210 P.3d 563, 572 (Ct. App. 2009).
Bliss has

shown

and “beyond

all

facts that

As

set forth

demonstrate MID’S actions were performed with malice, “atrocious”

possible bounds 0f decency”.

Bliss’ character

and standing

any decent person would do or
records to

members

manner unless they

say.

prior to a vote

in the

MID’S

false statements in witness statements,

MID

community, are

all

and continuing

atrocious actions

to harass

and

beyond what

showed, copied and handed out law enforcement

on board of directors.

are trying t0 maliciously

MID’S manager made

McPhee, 147 Idaho

above under the malice discussion,

intentionally seeking to prosecute Bliss for unsupported charges,

demean

v.

No

ordinary person behaves in such a

impugn someone

else’s character.

Moreover,

statements t0 Bliss about his charges that “shocked” Bliss. (R, p.245

(P.138, L.17 t0 P.139, L.3).
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MID’S conduct with
afﬁrmatively done.

this respect

To pursue

statements to law enforcement

was

harm, lower esteem by

and reckless

criminal action against Bliss

when MID

either

given Bliss permission to open the head gate

someone of a crime. MID’S

intentional

is

knew

as the actions

by making

or should have

outrageous.

It

n0

false

were

and misleading

known that Mr. Hunt had

different than falsely accusing

actions resulted in Bliss suffering damages, including emotional

Dan Davidson, and

loss

of credibility With other members.

While Bliss being arrested as a result 0f MID’S contradictory behavior, Bliss has also
suffered emotional distress as a result 0f MID’S continued interaction and refusal t0 address any

0f Bliss’ problems regarding the water

MID holds

in trust. In analyzing a claim for Intentional

Inﬂiction 0f Emotional Distress With respect t0 a statute 0f limitations the Court in Johnson

quoted the following language “[s]ince usually n0 single incident in a continuous chain of
tortious activity can

seems proper
P.3d

at

to get

"

fairly or realistically

be identiﬁed as the cause 0f signiﬁcant harm,"

t0 regard the cumulative effect

0f the conduct as actionable.” Johnson

571. Here in this case, Bliss has had so

MID to perform even the most basic

many unrealistic

services as required

challenges with

by

law, that there

at

MID
is

it

463, 210

and trying

also a

cumulative effect in which MID’S behavior becomes outrageous and actionable.

The

trial

court’s grant 0f

summary judgment 0n

Bliss’

HED claim should be reversed.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF FAILED
TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTANCE OF A CONTRACT WITH THE

5.

DEFENDANT.
Issue

The

district court erred

by ﬁnding

that Bliss

breach 0f contract. (R, p.43 1).

Standard ofReview

45

had not established a prima

facie case for

An Appeals
standard applied

all

Irr.

Court reviews a

by the

disputed facts and

trial court.

make

all

trial court's

Read at

grant 0f

summary judgment under the same

499, 112 P.3d at 787.

A reviewing court Will construe

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Sprinkler

C0. at 695-96, 85 P.3d at 671-72.

The summary judgment standards were succinctly

explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in Vreeken, 148 Idaho 89:

When reviewing an order for summary judgment,

this

Court

same standard 0f review that was used by the trial court
in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Summary
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
0n ﬁle, together with the afﬁdavits, if any, show that there is n0
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter 0f law." I.R.C.P. 56(0). The
burden is 0n the moving party t0 show that there are n0 genuine
issues 0f material fact. "If there is no genuine issue of material
fact, only a question 0f law remains, over Which this Court
applies the

exercises free review." Id. p. 101 (internal citations omitted).

Legal Argument

As

MID

discussed above, Bliss and

MID have an implied contract in Which Bliss provides

an easement across his property t0 traverse water and an assessment in exchange for MID’s

promise t0 maintain the ditches located in the easement and delivery 0f water t0 cultivate his
property.

A contract implied-in-fact is a true contract Whose terms are inferred from the conduct

of the parties and such contract

Medical Recovery Servs, LLC.
contract implied in law

is

is

v.

grounded

in the parties’

agreement and

tacit

understanding.

Neumeier, 163 Idaho 504, 508, 415 P.3d 372, 376 (2018).

not a contract at

all,

“A

but an obligation imposed by law for the purpose

of bringing about justice and equity Without reference to the intent or the agreement of the parties
and, in

some

cases, in spite of an

agreement between the parties.” Hull

777, 331 P.3d 507, 5 18 (2014). “This type of contract

enrichment, or restitution, and

is

is

Giesler, 156 Idaho 765,

also called a quasi contract, unjust

a non-contractual obligation that

46

v.

is

to

be treated procedurally as

if it

were a

contract.

I

“.
.

[T]he primary purpose of an irrigation district

.

.

limited t0 the

is

conducting 0f its business for the private beneﬁt of the landowners Within the
acquisition of water rights and the irrigation of lands within

within the district are the

beneﬁt by

As

its

members 0f the

corporation, control

operations.” Lewiston Orchards

Irr. Dist. at

MID has obligations

discussed above,

its

set forth

boundaries

its affairs,

.

.

district

.

by the

the land owners

and are primarily

381, 23 P.2d 722.

by law

as to

how

it is

t0 appropriately

hold the water in trust 0n behalf 0f Bliss, and obligations set forth over the parties’ course 0f
conduct.

The

trial

court only discussed one 0f these obligations,

the State of Idaho. (R, p.43

1).

However,

ditches that service Bliss’ property

MID

acknowledged

by not keeping

i.e.

that

it

that related t0 the statutes

of

has: 1) failed t0 maintain the

the ditch banks clear; 2) failed to keep the

ditch full sufﬁcient that Bliss could use the water at his head gate for irrigation purposes; 3) not

maintained a head gate that allows for the proper delivery of water t0 Bliss; and 4) enlarged
right-of—way in the easement

that

it is

required

by

it

uses further encroaching on Bliss’ property.

legal statute to

MID

if he is

MID.

Bliss

MID by state

Lastly, the breaches

t0

itself

in return for Bliss’ continued

is

of the

pay an assessment

MID. This would

inequitable and result in the unjust enrichment of MID. There

and services

statute are also part

would not be obligated

not entitled to expect anything in return from

Will provide water

admits

perform these services, but refuses to perform an appropriate

course 0f conduct. A11 of these items imposed 0n

implied contract between Bliss and

MID

granting

is

a clear understanding that

summary judgment

t0

MID

0n

is

a genuine issue 0f material fact precluding

Bliss’ breach

47

MID

payment 0f assessments.

complained 0f above are also clearly continuing breaches since

inapplicable. Therefore, there

t0

clearly be

has failed t0 remedy the situation that provides water t0 Bliss, and therefore the Statute 0f
Limitations

its

0f contract claim.

MID

6.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE IS NO
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY FOR A CLAIM OF DECLARATORY
RELIEF.

Issue

The

court committed reversible error

trial

The

for declaratory relief.

trial

court erred

by granting summary judgment on

by ﬁnding

Bliss has presented

Bliss’ claim

n0 evidence of an

actual 0r threatened injury t0 support a justiciable controversy for failure to deliver water to

The

Bliss. (R, p.434).

control noxious

trial

court also erred in ﬁnding that Idaho statutes providing duties t0

weeds negate the need

for declaratory relief. (R, p.434).

Standard ofReview

An Appeals
standard applied

all

Irr.

Court reviews a

by the

disputed facts and

trial court.

make

all

trial court's

Read at

grant 0f

summary judgment under the same

499, 112 P.3d at 787.

A reviewing court will construe

reasonable inferences in favor 0f the nonmoving party. Sprinkler

C0. at 695-96, 85 P.3d at 671-72.

The summary judgment standards were succinctly

explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in Vreeken, 148 Idaho 89 (2009):

When reviewing an order for summary judgment, this

Court applies

same standard of review that was used by the trial court in ruling
on the motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper
"if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 0n ﬁle, together With
the afﬁdavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as t0 any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(0). The burden is 0n the moving party t0
show that there are no genuine issues of material fact. "If there is no
genuine issue 0f material fact, only a question of law remains, over
which this Court exercises free review." Id. p. 101 (internal citations
the

omitted).

Legal Argument

Under Idaho law,

courts shall have

power t0 declare rights,

status,

and other legal

whether or not further relief is 0r could be claimed. LC. §10-1201; Paslay

48

at 869,

relations,

406 P.3d

at 881.

The Idaho Supreme Court has long held
remedial or preventive

relief; it

that the questioned right or status

may relate t0

Id.

Standing

Standing requires (1) a distinct injury in

Id.

plaintiff seeks relief,

the injury. Id.

invoke either

a right that has either been breached 0r

dispute or a statue undisturbed but threatened or endangered. Id.

must involve a justiciable controversy.

may

is

is

only yet in

A declaratory judgment action

an essential element of a justiciable claim.

fact, (2) fairly traceable t0 the

conduct from Which a

and (3) a substantial likelihood that the requested reliefwill remedy or prevent

Standing

may be predicated upon

harm

a threatened

as well as a past injury. Id. at

88 1 -2.
Bliss’ claims are justiciable

that

0n

MID

failed to deliver

his property. A11

seeking t0 restore

because Bliss has a distinct injury in

him water,

failed t0 maintain its canals

its

water delivery t0 him, maintain

An order of this

his water

and force

court Will

MID to remove

its

remedy or prevent
its

and

is

trespassing

canals,

Bliss

is

and removing the continuing

from further harm of not receiving

continuing trespass. These facts do not require the court to

hypothesize about anything because there

trial

drains,

Bliss has identiﬁed

0f these actions are traceable t0 the conduct 0f MID and the requests he

trespass.

The

and

fact.

is

evidence showing the Violation 0f Bliss’

court correctly points out that that both

MID

and Bliss have duties

rights.

to control

noxious weeds, but then refuses to determine the parties respective rights and legal relations to
adequately perform those duties. (R, p.434). In this case, the ditch rider for Bliss’ lateral ditch
states that in the six years

he has worked for

Bliss’ ditch. (R, p.269-70

(P29,

no spraying

MID has

done

L23

he has never performed any maintenance on

to P.30, L.2)).

t0 control the

(R, p.262 (P.18, L.17 t0 P.19, L.12)).

MID

Former Board member Mr. Goff knows of

noxious weeds on

its

Mr. Wart acknowledges

growing 0n the ditch banks. (R, p.27 1 (P.46, L.22

49

canal located on Bliss’ property.

that there

to P.47, L.12)).

have been

Former chairman

trees

for

MID

Wes Goff states that the trees 0n Bliss’
substantial neglect

ditch

0n the part 0f MID. (R, p.260

member’s property.

(R, p.264

(P32, L.15

to maintain the ditch resulted in a

Finally, declaratory relief

wrong on

which

of setup. (R, p.249 (P.1
facts

show

1,

L.4-15)). Yet,

MID

also

MID treats

other

members

MID canal through other

acknowledged

that the failure

plug not being removed from a drainage ditch, Which resulted

seems even more necessary and relevant When former Board of
that Bliss has a

results in Bliss’

“Mickey Mouse

head gate receiving

less

set

up” and

MID

“is

water than a different type

L.1-16), p.261 (P.16, L.22 t0 P.17, L.15), p.265 (P.34, L.6-10)). These

Bliss’ standing as

involved with Bliss’ claims.
ruling

1,

to P.33, L.5)).

Hunt and Wes Goff admit
this”,

(P.1

ﬂooded. (R, p.288 (P.27, L.2 t0 P28, L.17)).

in Bliss’ property being

in the

six (6) to eight (8) feet tall indicating

weeds and maintaining the

differently than Bliss, spraying their canal

Directors Frank

were

an injured person, that there

is

As

by granting summary judgment and

such, the

trial

court erred

a clear justiciable controversy

its

must be reversed and remanded.

CONCLUSION
The

Trial Court’s grant

matter of law,

ITCA

of summary judgment was in error and should be reversed. As a

does not apply t0 Bliss’s claims for Trespass and Breach of Fiduciary Duty

because they are based 0n contract law. However, Bliss sufﬁciently satisﬁed the
requirement for Count

V

(Wrongful Prosecution). The

contractual duties to Bliss.

There are

triable issues

trial

ITCA

MID

court erred in ﬁnding

notice

owes n0

of disputed fact sufﬁcient to support Bliss’

causes 0f action for Breach 0f Contract, Breach 0f Fiduciary Duty, Wrongful Prosecution, IIED,

and Declaratory Relief. Therefore,

it is

respectfully submitted that the Trial Court’s

Order be reversed and this matter remanded

t0 the trial court for trial. Bliss should

attorney fees and costs incurred 0n appeal in an

amount

50

t0

Judgment and

be awarded his

be established through afﬁdavit.

DATED THIS

31“ day of May, 2019.
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P.C.
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